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The underlying complex network of the Minority Game
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We study the structure of the underlying network of connections in the Minority Game. There is
not an explicit interaction among the agents, but they interact via global magnitudes of the model
and mainly through their strategies. We define a link between two agents by quantifying the similar-
ity among their strategies, and analyze the structure of the resulting underlying complex networks
as a function of the number of agents in the game and the value of the agents’ memory, in games
with two strategies per player. We characterize the different phases of this system with networks
with different properties, for this link definition. Thus, the Minority Game phase characterized
by the presence of crowds can be identified with a small world network, while the phase with the
same results as a random decision game as a random network. Finally, we use the Full Strategy
Minority Game model, to explicitly calculate some properties of its networks, such as the degree
distribution, for the same link definition, and to estimate, from them, the properties of the networks
of the Minority Game, obtaining a very good agreement with its measured properties.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 89.65.Gh, 89.75.Fb, 89.75.Hc
I. INTRODUCTION
The Minority Game (MG) was introduced in 1997 by
Challet and Zhang [1] as an attempt for catching some
essential characteristics of a competitive population, in
which an individual achieves the best result when he
manages to be in the minority group. The Minority
Game results itself an example of a complex system,
adaptive, agents based, with emergent properties like co-
ordination among the population. In the MG there are
N agents that in each step t of the game must choose
one of two alternatives (0 or 1, for example). Let N0(t)
and N1(t) be the number of agents choosing alternatives
0 and 1, respectively, such that N1(t) + N0(t) = N for
all values of t. The winers are those that happen to be
in the minority group for this time step t.
The history of the game is a sequence of m bits with
the last m sides that turned out to be the minority side
(m is identified as the memory of the agents). Agents
play using strategies; a strategy is a function that as-
signs a prediction for each one of the possible histories.
In this way, in a game with memory m, there are 2m dif-
ferent histories, and L = 22mpossible strategies. The set
of L strategies define the so called Full Strategy Space
(FSS). Each agent has s strategies, randomly chosen at
the beginning of the game from the FSS (with reposi-
tion). The game is adaptive because in every step agents
choose, among their s strategies, the one that has pre-
dicted more times the minority side. There is a system of
rewards that in each time step gives a point to the winner
agents; moreover, there also is a system whereby in every
time step one virtual point is assigned to all the strategies
that correctly predict the minority side, regardless if the
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strategy was used or not in this step.
The parameters of the model are N , m and s.
The more studied variable of the MG is σ =√
1
T
∑T
t=1(N1(t)−N0(t))2, a measure of the cooperation
of the agents, in the sense of achieving a better use of re-
sources from the population [2]. When |N1(t) − N0(t)|
is minimum, the minority group is the greatest possible,
then points assigned to the population are as great as
possible, and the contribution to σ, minimum. For each
one of the T time steps of one realization of the MG, we
obtain a data set of the variable N1(t) − N0(t). Then,
σ2 is an estimator of the second moment of the proba-
bility distribution of the variable N1(t) − N0(t) [3]. For
a game with s fixed, in principle, σ would depend of two
parameters, N and m, but it was found that µr = σ
2/N
shows scaling as a function of z = 2m/N [4]. There are
three regions in the behavior of the model: (i) a phase in
which µr > µ
rg
r (where µ
rg
r corresponds to a game where
decisions from agents are taken at random). This is the
regime where the players performance is the worst, be-
cause overall, the population receives fewer points. The
dynamics that characterizes this phase is such that in
some steps players go in crowds to one of the sides. (ii)
The second phase, where µr < µ
rg
r , is the region where
the population achieve more points, although the spread
in the distribution of points of the agents is the greatest.
(iii) Finally, a region where µr ≃ µrgr in which, the rules
of the MG gives the same result as in a game where the
decisions are taken at random.
The MG has been studied using different tools: nu-
merical simulations [1]-[4]; a generalization with a tem-
perature like variable [5]: mapping of the model to a
spin glass [6], a generalization that includes explicit in-
teractions between agents and exchange of information
[7]-[10]; mapping to an ensemble statistical model, the
Full Strategy Minority Game (FSMG) [11], and others.
In recent years, from many areas of science, there has
2been much interest on the properties of complex networks
of very different complex systems including social, comu-
nication, biochemical, ecosystems and internet networks
[12]-[14]. In this work we address two questions that
are usually raised for other complex systems: How is the
underlying complex network that connects players in this
model? and, Is the structure of this network related with
different properties of the model? The first step was to
formalize a connection among the MG agents, in order to
define the underlying network. We define a link among
two agents by quantifying the similarity between their
strategies; in this form, we define a static link (because
it will not change along the game), which characterizes
the game for the parameters N and m. Then we studied
different properties of the resulting networks. In Section
2 we will define the link, and the properties studied. In
Section 3, we will analyze the network of the FSMG,
given the same definition of the link we use for the MG,
and we analytically calculate the degree distribution of
these networks as a function of m. Finally, we will de-
scribe how we estimated the degree distribution of the
MG networks, from the known results of the FSMG. In
Section 4 we present our conclusions.
II. THE UNDERLYING NETWORK OF THE
MG
Different parameters of the model (N , m and s) lead to
games with players more or less connected. We chose to
work with the static network, i.e. the underlying network
that relates the players since the beginning of the game,
when they receive their randomly chosen strategies.
Before introducing the definition of link used, we need
to define the Hamming distance between two strategies.
The Hamming distance d between a pair of strategies is
the number of bits in which they differ, normalized by
the length of the strategy (measured by the number of
bits). In this work we will use the following definition of
the link:
there is a link between a pair of agents i and j if be-
tween each pair of strategies (taking one of each agent)
there is a Hamming distance less than d = 1/2.
Given a set of nodes of the network (the N players of
the game) and a set of K links or connections, we define
an associated network of the MG, GMG(N,K(N,m, s)),
that depends both on the definition of link used, and
on the initial conditions (i.e. the random assignation
of strategies to the agents). Our definition of link leads
to an unweighted, undirected network. We studied the
properties of GMG as a function of N and m, and s = 2
always. To find the network of connections, we generate
an allocation of strategies for both values N and m and
look at the resulting connections. We studied these net-
works for different values of the parametersm (between 2
and 14), and N (101, 501 and 1001). We averaged results
from different initial conditions.
In the following subsections, we study various proper-
ties of these networks, including the degree’s distribution,
the clustering coefficient, and the average minimum path.
A. Degree distribution
We study the distribution of degrees (i.e. the distri-
bution of the number of links of the nodes of GMG), for
different values of N and m, and compare them with the
known distribution of degrees of the random network of
Erdos-Renyi, GER(N,K), obtained for the same values
of N and K, but with links randomly allocated between
pairs of nodes. The link definition presented here leads
to a set of connections that grows with m. For small val-
ues of m, the degree distributions are very different from
that of a random network, whereas asm grows, they look
like those of a random network. In Figs. 1-4 we present
four cases for different values of m (m = 3, 5, 8 and 11)
and N = 1001; the continuous curve is the theoretical de-
gree distribution for an Erdos-Renyi network. The case
of m = 3 shows five peaks; this strange degree distribu-
tion can be explained using the mapping to the FSMG
model (see section III).
We calculated the chi square statistical hypothesis test,
to learn if the degree distribution obtained for GMG is
consistent with that of the GER. The significance values
found allows us to tell that the hypotesis is rejected for
m < 11, but it pass the test for m = 11.
B. Clustering and minimum mean path
We also calculate the clustering coefficient and the
minimum average path for GMG. Given a node ν with kν
links with the other nodes, the clustering coefficient me-
assures the fraction of edges that actually exist between
these nodes, out of all the possible edges that could exist
between them. The global clustering C is an average of
the clustering coefficients calculated by considering those
agents that have a degree greater than one.
We study C in terms ofm, for several values of N , and
compare our results with the known values for GER. We
found that C is a function of m, but does not depends
on N . We found that the MG clustering is much greater
than the corresponding value for random networks for
values of memory up to m = 8; for bigger values of m,
both coefficients are similar, as shown in Fig.5. As ob-
served in real networks, high clusterings are typical of
networks where the link represents a social relationship,
as the networks of friendships (it is very likely that some-
body’s friends are also friends between themselves). In
the case of MG, we see this feature for small values of
m, where there are crowds effects that make the system
inefficient in the use of resources. As m grows, although
the number of connections increases, clustering reflects
that these connections are allocated without transitivity,
i.e. the probability that two neighbors of a node are con-
nected to each other, is the same as the corresponding
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FIG. 1: Degree distribution histogram of MG networks for
m = 3 and N = 1001, averaged over 5 different initial condi-
tions. In the inset we show the location of the cases illustrated
in Figs.1-4, in the well known diagram showing the scaling of
µr with z (scaling is shown for 101 ≤ N ≤ 1001, and m ≤ 14).
Note that the probability of finding nodes of degree equal to
0 is approximately 0.035
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FIG. 2: Degree distribution Histogram of MG networks for
m = 5 and N = 1001
probability for a random network.
We calculate the average shortest path length between
two nodes in GMG and compare it with the correspond-
ing values for GER, for all values of N and m we work
with. In Fig.6 we can see that the minimum path of
GMG coincides with that of GER for almost all values
of m; moreover notice that this magnitude depends on
both N and m. Given both properties, clustering and
minimum average path, we can say that for small mem-
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FIG. 3: Degree distribution Histogram of MG networks for
m = 8 and N = 1001.
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FIG. 4: Degree distribution Histogram of MG networks for
m = 11 and N = 1001.
ory values the MG network is a small world, while for
greater values of m, GMG behaves as a random network.
III. NETWORK OF THE FULL STRATEGY
MINORITY GAME MODEL
The FSMG is a model introduced in [11] as a mapping
of the MG to other model with the same rules, but where
its N agents are chosen in a such a way that all possible
different agents that could exist, choosing strategies from
the FSS, are present. Thus, for a game with s = 2 strate-
gies for player, there are as many agents as the number of
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FIG. 5: Clustering coefficient as a function of m for games
with different number of agents. In all cases the results shown
are averages over 10 different initial conditions. MG data:
Filled circles, empty stars and filled triangles for N=101, 501
and 1001 respectively. Random games data: empty circles,
filled stars and empty triangles for N=101, 501 and 1001 re-
spectively.
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FIG. 6: Minimum mean path as a function of m for games
with different number of agents. MG data: filled and empty
squares, for N=501 and 1001, respectively; Random games
data: empty and filled triangles, for N=501 and 1001, re-
spectively. As before, the data shown is an average over 10
different initial conditions.
all possible pairs of strategies that can be formed (with
reposition) from the FSS of L strategies. Therefore, the
number of players will be:
N (m) =
( L
2
)
+ L =
(
22
m
2
)
+ 22
m
(1)
For simplicity, we write N ≡ N (m) in the following.
In a game with s = 3 strategies for agent, the number
of players of FSMG equals the number of groups of three
strategies from L, and so forth. In this case, we work
with s = 2.
We studied the properties of the complex network of
FSMG, given the same link definition between agents
that has been used to assemble networks of MG. By def-
inition, this network, GFSMG, has N nodes. As N is
only a function of m, the set of connections, K, is also
a function only of m. Then, the network and its proper-
ties only depend on m, i.e.: GFSMG(N (m),K(m)). For
example, in a game with m = 2, FSMG has N = 136
agents (then GFSMG will have N = 136 nodes). In the
following subsection, we describe the analytic calculation
of the degree distribution of GFSMG as a function of m.
A. Analytic calculation of the degree distribution
of the FSMG model
By definition, the FSMG model contains all possible
agents that can be formed from the complete set of L
strategies (each agent has s = 2 strategies from L, with
reposition). As it happened before (see reference [11]),
we again benefit from the symmetry associated with this
model, in which all possible strategies are present. As a
result of this symmetry, the degrees associated with the
FSMG network can just take only a few values. In fact,
the amount of different values is, at most, 2m + 1. For
m = 2, for example, there only exist nodes with degree
0, 2, 3 and 14 in the FSMG network.
We define N (m, d) as the number of nodes whose pairs
of strategies have among them a Hamming distance equal
to d. The expressions for N (m, d) are
N (m, d) = 2(2m−1)
(
2m
2md
)
for d 6= 0 (2)
N (m, d) = 22m for d = 0.
such that
∑
d ∈ {0, 12m ,...,1}
N (m, d) = N (m) (3)
In Ec. 3, the sum is over the possible values that can
take the variable d (0, 12m , ..., 1). It will be usefull to
define p(m, d), as
p(m, d) =
N (m, d)
N (4)
p(m, d) represents the probability of finding a node in
the FSMG network, for a game with memory m, whose
strategies have a Hamming distance given by d.
5As we will see, all nodes belonging to the same sub-
set N (m, d) will have the same degree, that we will call
k(m, d). Hence, the maximun number of possible degree
values is the number of possible values that can take the
variable d, namely 2m+1 values, i.e. the different subsets
of nodes that could exist.
Given a node of the subset N (m, d), there will be a
subset of strategies from which we can choose to form
nodes that have a connection to this node. We define
the size of this strategies subset as E(m, d), that only
depends of the values of m and d. Taking two strategies
of this subset, with reposition, we obtain a node that
will have a link with each of the nodes of the subset
N (m, d). Hence, all the nodes belonging to the subset
N (m, d) will have the same degree. Knowing E(m, d),
we can calculate the degree of the nodes of the subset
N (m, d), as the number of pairs that can be formed (with
reposition) from the subset E(m, d), which will be:
k(m, d) =
E(m, d) ∗ (E(m, d)− 1)
2
+ E(m, d) (5)
The only consideration is that, sometimes, when the
nodes of the subset N (m, d) can be linked with nodes of
the same subset, we must discount a node (a couple of
strategies) in k(m, d), in order not to consider the link
between a node with itself.
The calculation of E(m, d) can be found in the Ap-
pendix.
In the inset of Fig.7, we show the actual degree distri-
bution for GFSMG, for m = 3, called P (k). Even though
the maximum number of possible peaks can be 23+1 = 9,
in this case P (k) has only five peaks. This reduction is
due to the fact that subsets N (m, d) for differents val-
ues of d can have E(m, d) = E(m, d′) and, therefore, the
same degree.
B. Estimating parameters of the networks GMG
from those of the networks GFSMG
From the analytic calculation of the degree distribution
of GFSMG, we can estimate the degree distribution of
GMG, for a given value of N . The set of nodes of GMG
is a sample of all nodes of the FSMG network. This
sample is selected at random, because the assignation of
strategies to agents of the MG is done randomly. Thus,
one has to choose N nodes at random, with replacement
(because in the MG it can be identical players) from the
set of N nodes of the GFSMG.
By choosing only N nodes, we are considering a subset
of nodes and a subset of connections, i.e. a subgraph
induced by the set of nodes N . The relationship between
N and N tells how representative is this sample. We call
q = N/N the probability that a node of the FSMG be
elected to form the network of MG. The question we are
trying to answer is how to infer the degree distribution
of GMG (that we call P (k˜)) from P (k), the known degree
distribution of GFSMG.
As mentioned before, the FSMG networks have a dis-
crete degree distribution, P (k), that can take at most
2m + 1; in fact not only the values, but also their loca-
tion and height depends only of m. The degree distribu-
tion of MG network will also be discrete (by definition of
degree), but the variable may take any integer value, k˜ ,
with certain probability P (k˜). Going from FSMG to MG,
each peak of P (k) becomes a probability distribution.
We will first analize how one peak of P (k) becomes a
probability distribution. Let consider, for instance, the
peak of degree ki. For the subset of nodes of FSMG
with a given degree value ki, the probability of one node
being chosen to be part of the set of N agents of MG, is
q. The probability that each of the neighboring nodes of
this node is chosen is also q. Therefore, the probability
distribution of degrees k˜ for this subset of chosen nodes
for MG that in the FSMG network had degree ki is now
a binomial distribution:
(
ki
k˜
)
qk˜(1− q)ki−k˜ (6)
whose mean value and variance are:
< k˜ >= kiq (7)
(σ
k˜
)2 = kiq(1− q) (8)
We use the Central Limit theorem to aproximate the
binomial distribution by a gaussian distribution, with the
same values of variance and mean:
1√
2piσ
k˜
e−(˜k−<k˜>)
2/2σ2
k˜ (9)
In our calculations for m > 2 it is q << 1, so we
approximate σ
k˜
≃ √kiq.
Finally, all peaks of P (k) will contribute to P (k˜), which
results:
P (k˜) =
∑
i
P (ki)
1√
2pikiq
e−(˜k−kiq)
2/2kiq (10)
where the sum is over all the peaks of P(k).
We compare the MG network degree distribution es-
timated from the FSMG, with that obtained from real-
izations of networks of the MG, in a game of N = 1001
agents. In Fig.7 it is possible to see the very good ad-
justment found for N = 1001 and m = 3. It is remark-
able, in particular, the excelent fit obtained for the prob-
ability to have a disconected node in the MG network,
P (k˜ = 0) = P (k = 0) = 0.035
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FIG. 7: Degree distribution for MG networks, for N = 1001
and m = 3. The histogram is an average over 10 different
realizations. The continuous line shows the distribution esti-
mated using the FSMG, see Eq. 10.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
As far as we know, this work is the first attempt to
caracterize the implicit interactions between MG agents,
as a complex network.
We formalize an underlying network for the Minority
Game, by quantifying the similarity of the strategies be-
tween two agents. Given the resulting definition of the
link, one can see that in the MG phase characterized by
the presence of crowds, its network can be identified as a
small world, whereas in the phase where the system be-
haves like in a game of random decisions, the underlying
network behaves as a random one, with the same clus-
tering coefficient, degree distribution and minimal path.
We analytically calculate the degree distribution for the
underlying network of the FSMG model, and from this
distribution, we estimated the degree distribution of MG
networks, with a very good agreement. This reflects,
again, that the FSMG is a useful model to study the
MG.
It would be interesting to explore in the future the ef-
fect of employing weigthed links in these networks. And
in those cases where an explicit interaction between some
agents are introduced, it could be of some help to add to-
gether the effects of the networks of explicit and implicit
interactions.
V. APPENDIX
In the following we will explain in detail the form in
which we did the calculation of E(m, d). As mentioned
in III A, E(m, d) is the size of the set of strategies from
which one can choose to form nodes that have a link with
some node of the subset N (m, d).
We defined a link between two agents when, among
each pair of strategies (one of each agent), there is a
Hamming distance d < 1/2. Let us call δ the threshold,
such that the previous condition became d ≤ δ. For
example, for the case of m = 2, δ = 1/4 and for m = 3,
δ = 3/8, and in general,
δ =
1
2
− 1
2m
(11)
To find E(m, d) we consider both strategies of a node
of N (m, d), and count how many strategies have a nor-
malized Hamming distance with both strategies smaller
or equal than δ.
As an example, let us count the case of nodes with
zero degree. These are the nodes belonging to the subset
N (m, d) such that E(m, d) = 0 and therefore do not have
connectivity. The cases ofm and d for which E(m, d) = 0
are such that d − δ > δ, i.e. d > 2δ. This is so since if
the distance between two strategies is greather than 2δ,
it does not exist any strategy whose Hamming distance
to the couple of strategies is simultaneously smaller or
equal than δ.
Therefore, for the case m = 2:
E(m = 2, d = 1) = 0
E(m = 2, d = 3/4) = 0
Whereas for m = 3:
E(m = 3, d = 1) = 0
E(m = 3, d = 7/8) = 0
And, for general values of m:
E(m, d > 2δ) = 0
k(m, d > 2δ) = 0
As another example, we will calculate E(m, d = 0),
that is to say, we want to find the connectivity of the
nodes of the subset N (m, d = 0) (subset of nodes formed
by two equal strategies). In this case one has to count
all the strategies that differ from the node’s strategies in
a bit, two bits, three bits ... up to 2mδ bit. It is:
E(m, d = 0) =
2mδ∑
i=0
(
2m
i
)
Since this expression includes the strategies that forms
the node, then in the calculation of the degree of nodes of
the subset N (m, d = 0), we discount a couple of strate-
gies, since we do not consider the connection of a node
with itself. Therefore:
7k(m, d = 0) =
E(m, d = 0)(E(m, d = 0)− 1)
2
+E(m, d = 0)−1
The case d = 2δ gives:
E(m, d = 2δ) =
(
2δ 2m
δ 2m
)
=
(
d 2m
d 2m−1
)
When δ < d < 2δ one finds
E(m, d) =
2mδ∑
i=(d−δ)2m
(
d 2m
i
) J(i)∑
j=0
(
(1− d) 2m
j
)
where J(i) = min{2m(δ − d) + i; δ2m − i}
Finally, for the case 0 < d < δ the result is
E(m, d) =
2md∑
i=0
(
d 2m
i
) 2mδ−J(i)∑
j=0
(
(1− d) 2m
j
)
where J(i) = |max{2md− i, i}|
For the last three cases, the degree, k(m, d), will be
calculated as in Ec. 5.
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